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Abstract 
The use of quantified indicators for the implementation and measurement of 
social progress is a well-established policy tool. However, any form of ‘social 
progress’ is inherently contested and a meaningful application of indicators in 
such contexts poses numerous challenges. In this paper we explore how 
indicators might be used to research and implement sustainable prosperity. We 
do this by reviewing key critiques of indicators and their political use (and 
misuse), drawing out lessons from previous indicator projects such as the UN 
Sustainable Development Goals, and Taking Part. We argue that because classic 
indicators rely on simplification and quantification, they struggle to do justice to 
objectives like sustainable prosperity which come with conflicting 
understandings and contain unquantifiable subjective elements. Indicators can 
only be a partial representation of sustainable prosperity, we find, and thus 
should not be understood as a way to measure it, but a way of articulating a 
particular set of political priorities. This way indicators can be a useful tool for 
constructing new understandings, holding powerful actors to account and 
enabling engagement with policy end goals. 
 
1 Introduction 
Indicators are widely perceived to be useful tools for researching and guiding 
various forms of societal progress, including sustainability (Singh et al., 2012), 
human rights (Merry, 2011) and wellbeing (Self and Randall, 2013). For example, 
the Compendium of Sustainability Indicator Initiatives lists 895 sustainability 
initiatives that either use or develop sustainability indicators (IISD, 2011). 
Likewise, many national and international sustainability plans have made 
indicators a key part of their implementation (Lyytimäk, 2012). A high profile 
case is the United Nations (UN) post-2015 development plan, Agenda 2030. 
Signed off by 193 countries, Agenda 2030 is centred on 17 ‘Sustainable 
Development Goals’ with more than 200 indicators. The indicators are described 
as essential “to help with the measurement of progress”, “ensure that no one is 
left behind”, and “key to decision making” (UN, 2015, p. 12). In this paper we 
explore the extent to which such claims about the role of indicators are justified. 
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 1.1 The Pros and Cons of Indicator Use 
Indicators are central to many sustainability and other socio-cultural projects 
because they are a useful way to generate knowledge of, and communicate about, 
complex issues. Indicators break complex issues into more readily understood 
chunks of information thus allowing communication between experts and non-
experts (Merry, 2011, Morse, 2016). Likewise, through selecting and measuring a 
finite set of quantified indicators that approximate the essential elements of a 
concept, experts can ‘measure’ an otherwise immeasurable entity (Turnhout et 
al., 2007). There is a long history of using indicators in this way in the biological 
sciences, particularly ecology (Bell and Morse, 2008) and indicators are applied 
similarly in sustainability research (for example, Mair et al., 2016)). In such cases, 
indicators can function as an analytical structure, mediating between the 
nuanced, complex, and difficult to interrogate concept of sustainability and the 
blunt analytical tools with which complex systems can be investigated. 
Additionally, indicators are necessary inputs for the investigation of complex 
concepts by other research tools such as models.  
However, indicators have been widely critiqued. Indicators are reductionist 
analytical tools and their use risks oversimplification, particularly in highly 
complex and contested contexts (Morse and Bell, 2008; Merry, 2011) where their 
use can often hide the complexity and interrelations of the underlying system. 
This can be especially problematic because of how users interact with indicators. 
A selected set of indicators to measure a certain concept, such as sustainable 
prosperity, is often assumed to be objective and a complete description of the 
concept it measures. However, in reality the choice of particular indicators is 
often value-laden and incomplete (Merry, 2011, Porter, 1995). Additionally, 
indicators can be biased by the specific indicator construct (conceptualization of 
the indicator), the determination of the representative sample used to gather 
data or the choice of statistical methods for the data aggregation. Moreover, 
indicators help us to construct knowledge and guide decision making. 
Consequently, where they inadequately describe a contested concept, that 
concept may even become re-defined in terms of its indicators (Bell and Morse, 
2008, Espeland and Sauder, 2007). This can lead to policies and strategies that 
focus on what is measurable rather than addressing less tangible or measurable 
issues.  For example, the use of GDP as an indicator of societal progress has led 
to a reframing of societal progress as predominantly about increased productive 
capacity of the economy, creating a ‘growth imperative’ (Jackson, 2016).   
In fact, GDP is a particularly pertinent example of the dangers of indicators. First 
it is an inadequate measure of societal progress because it misses important 
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 factors that contribute to broader conceptions of progress (Prescott-Allen, 2001, 
Stiglitz et al., 2009, Anderson, 2014). Furthermore, GDP growth is strongly 
correlated with negative environmental impacts (Antal, 2014) and the extent to 
which it can solve social problems is questionable (Victor, 2007), at least in the 
case of developed countries. Such criticisms occasionally find an echo in political 
discourse. Robert Kennedy (1968) famously disparaged economic growth as a 
measure of progress: 
“Gross National Product counts air pollution and cigarette advertising, and 
ambulances to clear our highways of carnage… Yet the gross national 
product not does not allow for the health of our children, the quality of their 
education or the joy of their play… it can tell us everything about America 
except why we are proud that we are Americans.” 
Likewise, Tony Blair (DETR, 1999) argued:  
“there is a growing realisation that real progress cannot be measured by 
money alone…But in the past, governments have seemed to forget this. 
Success has been measured by economic growth - GDP - alone. We have 
failed to see how our economy, our environment and our society are all one. 
And that delivering the best possible quality of life for us all means more than 
concentrating solely on economic growth.” 
However, for all such misgivings and promises to change focus, policymakers 
have yet to move on from the use of GDP as a proxy measure of progress. We see 
this even in the SDGs, which have been widely praised as “holistic” and for 
moving the development away from GDP alone, but nonetheless have an entire 
goal (Goal 8) which not only aims to promote sustained economic growth 
(measured as GDP), but also conflates GDP growth with concerns about decent 
jobs. GDP growth continues to be the principal objective of most government 
policy (Victor, 2007), and there is little sign that this is changing. 
 
1.2 Indicators for a Better Future? 
As researchers and citizens, the authors of this paper are interested in how 
indicators may or may not be used to help imagine, explore and create a better 
future. Specifically, all the authors of this paper are engaged in work and 
research into ‘sustainable prosperity’. Sustainability and prosperity are both 
ideas that have been widely used in plans for societal progress (the UN Global 
Goals, for example, use both). We understand sustainable prosperity as a good 
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 future, a world in which people everywhere have the capability to flourish as human 
beings whilst remaining within the ecological and resource constraints of a finite 
planet (Jackson et al., 2016). However, sustainable prosperity remains a highly 
contested concept and, given that indicators can be problematic in the absence 
of a fully agreed definition, the use of indicators to flesh it out should be 
approached with care. 
Therefore, in this paper we critically engage with indicators, particularly where 
they have been used in the context of contested and complex phenomena. Based 
on a review of the literature, we critique the use of indicators as they have been 
used for various socio-cultural projects, with a view to understanding how they 
may be used in our work on sustainable prosperity. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we describe 
sustainable prosperity as a contested concept. In section 3 we highlight that 
indicators of contested concepts are not neutral, but instead represent a 
particular perspective on an issue. We then demonstrate the difficulties this 
raises, illustrated in relation to the United Kingdom (UK), European Union (EU) 
and United Nations (UN) sustainable development indicator sets (see Appendix). 
In section 4 we elaborate on this, highlighting how indicators of contested 
concepts risk oversimplification as they struggle to deal with the complexity of 
moral and ethical problems. Finally, in section 5 we mount a qualified defence of 
indicators, arguing that although these two critiques should influence how we 
use indicators in contested systems, they do not altogether negate their 
usefulness. 
 
2 Sustainable Prosperity 
 ‘Sustainable Prosperity’ is a highly contested concept. Both sustainability and 
prosperity relate to issues that are very subjective and politically sensitive. 
Therefore, sustainable prosperity may be more of an affective-cognitive 
construct (Davern et al., 2007) than a tightly defined analytical term. In other 
words, sustainable prosperity as a concept, and how it might be measured, is 
dependent on each person’s world view. For example, the precise understanding 
of sustainable prosperity depends on how political and institutional contexts 
frame each person’s perceptions.  
Even the elements of sustainable prosperity that appear to relate to objective 
physical realities intersect with highly value-laden problems. For example, a 
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 common theme in discussing sustainable prosperity is the presence of physical 
planetary limits and the impetus they provide for us to reduce environmental 
damage. While planetary limits are grounded in physical science (Rockström et 
al., 2009, Steffen et al., 2015) they are constructed in such a way as to keep the 
human economy in a relatively benign environment. For example, a biodiversity 
‘limit’ assumes that we value today’s biodiversity more than historic or future 
biodiversity and does not account for the idea that a new biodiversity could 
flourish under the conditions of a changed environment. Furthermore, the 
impact of planetary limits on our ability to live good lives is highly contested and 
subjective. We take the view that any understanding of sustainable prosperity 
must be cognizant of these physical limits, thus positioning sustainable 
prosperity as a ‘strong’ view of sustainability where natural capital and man-
made capital are complements rather than substitutes (Daly et al., 1995).  But of 
course this too is contentious. As the name ‘strong’ sustainability suggests, there 
is an alternative reading of the impact of planetary limits (‘weak’ sustainability) 
which views them as being of negligible importance in the construction of 
sustainable policies. 
Other elements of sustainable prosperity (indicators) are also contested. For 
example, central to our understanding of sustainable prosperity is that it is a 
multi-dimensional concept about more than just the economic health of society. 
In our view, a prosperous society is one that is concerned not only with income 
and financial wealth, but also with the health and wellbeing of its citizens, with 
access to good quality education, and with their prospects for decent and 
rewarding work. Sustainable prosperity enables basic individual rights and 
freedoms but also goes beyond this and allows people to flourish. But what is 
flourishing? What are the capabilities that enable flourishing? 
Likewise, for us, inter- and intra-generational justice and equity is a core 
element of sustainable prosperity, such issues can be measured by indicators 
such as the Gini coefficient or the more general ‘poverty reduction’. Another 
element that could be important is civil engagement and democratic 
inclusiveness, and the autonomy to act, particularly at the community level 
(Böhmelt et al., 2015, Howard and Wheeler, 2015). In achieving sustainable 
prosperity, issues concerning finance and the economy are also likely to play an 
important role, as are issues around diversity of ownership, and investment 
models (Vickers and Lyon, 2014, Jackson and Victor, 2016).  
The indicators we choose are influenced by the vision of prosperity that we have, 
and choosing the wrong indicator will lead to the ‘wrong’ prosperity. We explore 
this difficulty in the next section. 
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 3 Indicators are limited interpretations, not objective 
descriptions. 
 
 
Contested concepts defy the naive understanding of indicators as readily 
digestible representations of the essential components of a larger system. In this 
theory researchers construct new information or communicate about the system 
as a whole (Bell and Morse, 2008, Figure 1) by combining and interpreting 
multiple indicators of the system. Although this understanding is applicable in 
perfectly objective and well understood systems, contested concepts, conversely, 
are characterised by multiple and conflicting ideas about how any given system 
works. As a result, any given indicator set is only able to represent a subset of 
these understandings and the differences in these understandings result in 
different indicators (Meadows, 1998, Davis et al., 2015).  Therefore, an indicator 
of a contested system should not be understood as a piece of information about a 
system, but a piece of information reflecting how an individual or group 
conceptualises that system (Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The naïve view of indicators (I), adapted from Bell and Morse (2008). ‘I1 to I7 collect 
information (indicated by arrows) about the system. 
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Figure 2: The concept of indicators as applied to highly contested and badly understood systems. 
While there are multiple conflicting understandings of contested systems, a given indicator set can only 
represent one (or a small subset) of those understandings. 
	
3.1 Three different understandings of Sustainable Development 
To illustrate how the ability to represent only a limited perspective creates 
difficulties for those who would use indicators in contested systems, we compare 
three indicator frameworks that aim to measure and implement sustainable 
development. The UK (Lofts and Macrory, 2015), EU (Eurostat, 2015) and United 
Nations (through the Sustainable Development Goals - SDGs) have each 
developed a set of sustainability indicators. Comparing these three indicator sets 
is instructive because they have substantial differences, despite all being focused 
on the same concept and being primarily designed for the same users (nation 
states).  
It is not just that the processes leading to these sets of indicators could not agree 
on common statistical metrics – they fundamentally could not agree on how to 
frame the indicator sets. At the most basic level, each set contains a different 
number of indicators or targets (see Appendix):   
• SDGs – 17 goals, 169 targets, 230 Indicators 
• EU sustainable development indicators (SDIs) – 10 thematic areas 
(with headline indicator), 132 indicators  
• UK SDIs – 3 thematic areas, 66 indicators  
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 Looking deeper, there are only three indicators that use the same statistical 
measure across the three frameworks: 1) GDP per capita, 2) Greenhouse gas 
emissions, 3) Share of renewable energy. Likewise, there are only six further 
indicators that have a common outcome even if the statistical measure is not 
exactly the same: 1) Increase research and development, 2) Reduce air pollution 
(or the impact of air pollution), 3) Increase water efficiency, 4) Increase river 
quality, 5) Regulation of fishing, 6) Protection of forests. Some of these 
differences are understandable: it is natural that a national framework to 
measure progress towards sustainability may have different targets from an 
international framework (there is little reason for the UK to have a national 
target relating to rainforests, for example). However, many of the differences are 
less intuitive.  
Several key aspects of the frameworks appear common in nature but offer very 
different indicator sets. For example, ‘poverty’ appears in all three indicator sets 
but with a number of different statistical measures. The UN’s Global Goals’ 
(SDGs) poverty indicators focus on the proportion of a national population 
suffering from various dimensions of poverty. Income and monetary aspects of 
poverty are captured through measures of people living below national and 
international poverty lines, while more social dimensions of poverty are 
captured by measuring the proportion of the population unable to access social 
protection systems and lacking access to basic services. In contrast, the UK’s 
poverty SDIs focus predominantly on the proportion of children living in low 
income households, where income is defined both in absolute and relative terms.  
Indicators both reflect and help construct theoretical perspectives and problem 
conceptualisations (Merry, 2011): the differences in the UK SDI and the SDG 
poverty indicators represent alternative understandings of poverty. The UK SDIs 
emerge from a conceptualisation of poverty as a primarily monetary problem, 
albeit with a role for societal norms around income. Further, the UK SDI theory 
of poverty sees households with children as the most at risk group (either 
because they are most likely to be affected, or likely to suffer the most). 
Conversely, the SDG poverty indicators emerge from a conceptualisation of 
poverty as problem that is broader than income alone (hence the inclusion of 
indicators on societal safety nets); they are based on a view of poverty as a 
problem for people of all ages (with indicators focused on a range of 
demographics); and they do not view societal norms as particularly important. 
Instead the SDGs focus on the absolute understanding of poverty and have no 
explicit indicators for relative poverty. 
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 Beyond poverty, there are other examples of differences in the three indicator 
sets that reflect differences in theoretical understandings. For example, public 
health, where the SDGs and the EU SDIs focus on specific measurable health 
outcomes (such as maternal mortality, mental health, suicide rates or access to 
health care), the UK SDIs take a broader perspective that also encompasses more 
indirect influences on mental health, such as civic participation, whether people 
perceive that their neighbours can be trusted and if they have close relationships. 
In the main, these concepts are missing from the SDGs and EU SDIs. On the 
other hand, absent at the UK level are measures of trust in governance. The 
promotion of the rule of law, reduction in corruption, access to information, 
voter turnout and confidence in government are measured at both SDG and EU 
SDI levels (in different ways).  
 
3.2 Indicators shape how we view the world 
The differences in the three indicator sets may also drive outcomes that 
undermine each other. Indicators refocus attention on to the elements of a 
concept that they measure and away from the elements that they do not. In this 
way, indicators direct how their users think about and attempt to deal with the 
concept itself (Espeland and Sauder, 2007, Merry, 2011). For example, the UK 
SDIs include a measure of the origin of food consumed in the UK, while the EU 
SDIs include a measure of imports from developing countries by group of 
products. Therefore, at the UK level there is a target to reduce food imports 
while at the EU level there is a target to increase them (albeit from a specific set 
of countries). Likewise it seems reasonable to suggest that that the UK SDI 
poverty indicators will result in different policies and outcomes than the SDG 
poverty indicators. For example, if the UK reduced the coverage of its social 
protection systems but simultaneously increased the average income of 
households with children, poverty could get both worse (according to the SDG 
definition) and better (according to the UK SDI definition)!  
 
4 Indicators struggle with unquantifiable, moral issues. 
Indicators are further challenged by the difficulty of codifying, quantifying and 
linking important elements of contested concepts. The chief utility of indicators 
comes from their simplification of complex issues, making the ideas more 
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 manageable. By definition, this requires losing information. Often, this 
information is the contextual and qualitative, discarded because it is hard to 
quantify or otherwise codify, rather than because it is unimportant (Porter, 1995). 
Moreover, indicator sets have typically been developed without explicit 
consideration of their ethical basis and the moral assumptions embedded in the 
choice and content of particular indexes. Fredericks (2014, p.6) argues that ‘there 
is a widespread assumption in modern Western society that technical and ethical 
assessments are, and should be, completely separable’. This needs to be rejected, in 
her view, on the grounds that ‘developing indexes without explicit attention to 
ethics runs the risk of ineffective indexes, or even worse, indexes which drive people 
away from their vision of sustainability’ (Fredericks, 2014, p. 9). This crucial point 
about the ethical dimension of indicators can be made also in relation to values 
concerning aesthetic judgements, cultural goals and ultimate human ends.  
 
4.1 Arts, Culture, and Ultimate Ends 
Informative examples of the ways in which indicators struggle with messy and 
difficult to codify ideas and relationships are found in arts and culture indicator 
initiatives such as ‘Taking Part’. This is not to say that arts and culture offer a 
unique challenge when it comes to the use of indicators, as economic indicators 
also have significant problems associated with their measurement and use 
however the Taking Part initiative offers a useful case to explore. Taking Part is 
perhaps the largest and most prominent attempt to provide data on the cultural 
sector in England. Research using Taking Part data claims to provide “robust 
evidence” (DCMS, 2014, p. 4) of links between certain kinds of cultural 
participation and subjective wellbeing (wellbeing as measured through how 
individuals describe their own feelings). However, establishing causal links 
between participation/engagement and other outcomes – such as increased 
wellbeing – proves difficult. Though quantitative analyses from the UK, as well 
as Canada, Italy and elsewhere, demonstrate a link between engagement in art 
and culture, and wellbeing, for many, “the challenges of disentangling 
confounding variables and establishing directions of causality remain” (Crossick 
and Kaszynska, 2016, p. 38).  
Daly’s Pyramid (Meadows, 1998; Figure 3), is a useful framework for 
understanding why connecting the Taking Part participation indicators to 
‘wellbeing’ is difficult.  
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Figure 3. Daly's Pyramid, taken from Meadows (1998) 
Daly’s Pyramid frames indicators as falling into one of four categories: at the top 
of the pyramid are Ultimate Ends – happiness, wellbeing, flourishing. These are 
the things that we strive for, the high level concepts that together (arguably) 
constitute prosperity. At the base of the pyramid are the Ultimate Means – the 
fundamental earth systems without which we could not survive, let alone 
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 prosper. In between the two are intermediate means (human labour, tools, 
processed raw materials etc.) which are used to produce intermediate ends 
(consumer goods, knowledge, services etc.). Intermediate ends are tools that are 
necessary to achieve our ultimate ends.  
Taking Part measures intermediate ends, gathering information about 
participation and engagement in the arts, museums and galleries, archives, 
libraries, heritage, and sport. The survey includes data on frequency of 
participation. This is important as it draws a distinction between participation, a 
binary state whereby an individual participates or not, and engagement, which it 
suggests is related to the frequency of participation. Further questions aim to 
uncover drivers and barriers to participation. For example, respondents are 
asked about service provision in their area (e.g. new or closing facilities), and 
whether they have experienced a range of life events (such as moving house or 
illness) that could affect participation. It also captures socio-demographic data, 
including each respondent’s education level, income, occupation, marital status 
and health. These data are released at 6 monthly intervals and provides headline 
figures on participation and engagement, broken down by, for example, age, 
ethnicity or region (DCMS, 2015).  
However, ‘wellbeing’ is an ultimate end, not an intermediate end, and it is in 
connecting the two that problems arise. The data collected in Taking Part allows 
researchers to produce models that control for other factors (such as income) 
and provide a statistical evidence-base for claims about the positive impacts of 
cultural activity that, importantly, can speak to government objectives premised 
on public utility and notions of wellbeing (Walmsley, 2012). But, as Daly’s 
Pyramid makes explicit, ultimate ends indicators are the outputs of ethical and 
theological frameworks. In other words, they emerge from a process of highly 
personal interpretation informed not only by quantifiable measures but by 
emotional and moral reasoning. As Walmsley (2012, p. 329) argues, many of the 
ways that culture and art influence wellbeing are personal and intrinsic, taking 
us “into the incommensurable realms of spirituality and emotion”.? 
Complexity and immeasurability are not specific to wellbeing and the arts but 
also to other ‘ultimate ends’: happiness, harmony, community. How can 
psychological and personal growth, helping others or creating something new be 
measured? There may be some proxies for wider social benefits, such as health 
or education outcomes, but there is also a risk that inputs which are easier to 
measure, such as spending on health or education systems, do not capture the 
desired outcomes and, if captured as proxy indicators, become the desired 
outcomes in themselves. Rather than simply linking subjective wellbeing or 
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 prosperity to cultural or community activity, an approach to understanding how 
human and social capital (the ‘intermediate ends’) promotes wellbeing (the 
‘ultimate ends’) through the role of individual capabilities, using indicators such 
as the ability to exercise creativity, and imagination is needed. 
As noted in the introduction of this paper, perhaps the clearest example of a 
proxy outcome becoming a desired outcome is GDP. GDP is properly understood 
as an intermediate means on Daly’s pyramid: GDP measures the productive 
capacity of the economy, which we can use to produce intermediate ends and 
then ultimate ends. Viewed in this way it is unsurprising that increases in GDP 
often have a weak (or in some cases negative) relationship with ultimate ends 
such as happiness and health (REFS). GDP is a tool we can use to achieve our 
ultimate ends, but it will not always be an appropriate tool. But because GDP is 
much easier to measure than the quality of jobs (SDG 8) or how well the 
economy meets our needs (EU/UK SDIs), it has become the proverbial hammer 
and we view all our problems as nails. 
Finally, it is worth noting here that the lack of clarity and difficulty of 
quantification is not confined to the moral aspects of ultimate ends. It takes, as 
Porter (1995, p. 41) puts it, an enormous amount of effort “to arrange an unruly 
humanity into uncomfortable categories”. Consequently, arbitrary exclusion and 
subjective categorisation are apparent even in the more mundane aspects of 
intermediate and ultimate ends indicators. Efforts to produce indicators for 
cultural work, for instance, are hampered by unclear boundaries and distinctions 
that make even counting the number of cultural workers difficult. Taking a 
sectoral approach to these labour markets includes large numbers of individuals 
in non-‘creative’ roles while excluding cultural/creative workers in non-‘creative’ 
industries, while approaches that seek to utilise ‘creative intensity’ ultimately 
include consultancy and management roles that have little cultural output 
(Bakhshi, Freeman & Higgs, 2013; O’Brien & Oakley, 2015: 12-13). 
 
4.2 Indicators that ignore essential elements risk undermining the concept 
they purport to measure. 
 
These issues are particularly problematic because of the power of indicators to 
shape the thoughts and actions of researchers and decision makers: through 
indicator use, the more complex and qualitative aspects of ultimate ends risk 
being lost or ignored. As discussed in 3.2, indicators can come to redefine 
concepts by directing attention only to those dimensions captured by the 
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 indicator (Merry, 2011). The act of measuring is not passive; rather, it shapes and 
defines what it is we are measuring, highlighting aspects to be important and, by 
omission, defining those aspects that are not important. As a result, indicators 
that ignore important elements of a concept may lead to policies that either 
overlook or actively conflict with the original concept as it is more broadly 
understood. In the arts, for example, Oakley et al. (2013, p. 24) point out that 
‘well-being-friendly’ cultural policy may exacerbate current wellbeing 
inequalities, while also stemming the production of new work that can be viewed 
as “difficult, upsetting, challenging, or simply solitary”. 
Furthermore, there is a risk of concepts being redefined at all levels of society. 
Quantitative measures give the appearance of objectivity and neutrality: 
numbers often hide the complexity and value-laden nature of the judgements 
used in their construction (Porter, 1995). Where these constructions are very 
complex it is difficult for non-experts to challenge the indicator (Merry, 2011). 
Even where experts are willing to challenge the indicator, if the only dissenting 
voices have little political power it is easy for the indicator to remain neutral in 
appearance, and the concept to be re-defined (Espeland and Sauder, 2007). 
Arts and culture once again provides a useful example of such risks. Neither art 
nor culture are included in the UK Office for National Statistics assessment of 
wellbeing, perhaps because they are too difficult to measure (Walmsley, 2012). 
Likewise there are no arts or culture based indicators under SDG goal 3 “Ensure 
healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages”. Instead this goal opts for 
indicators that are based on much more easily quantified aspects of health such 
as maternal death rates and rates of new HIV infections.  By ignoring arts and 
culture, wellbeing indicators may reduce actions that promote cultural and 
artistic dimensions of wellbeing; potentially leading to reduced wellbeing. 
	
5 A Qualified Defence of Indicators 
Despite the problems of indicators described in the above sections, we still 
believe that indicators have a useful, if limited, role to play in implementing 
sustainable prosperity. This section makes that case. The previous two sections 
critiqued the use of indicators in contested concepts on the grounds that they 
are only able to represent a small subset of understandings of that concept, and 
that they struggle to deal with messiness and complexity, often excluding 
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 important elements on these grounds. Here we draw on these critiques and begin 
to outline how we see indicators being usefully applied going forwards. 
 
5.1 Indicators can clarify political views and increase accountability. 
While indicators remove contextual information and obscure the process 
through which this happens, they also force a clarity and rigour that exposes 
political priorities and beliefs. This is seen clearly in Agenda 2030. The 17 UN 
Global Goals for Sustainable Development (SGDs) often describe quite broad 
concepts that are accepted by a majority of global society and are apparently 
compatible with national sustainability initiatives. However, the SDG indicators 
reveal very specific perspectives on these problems some of which directly 
conflict with national perspectives. We have already discussed how indicators 
reveal very different conceptualisations of ‘poverty’ in the UK SDIs and the SDG 
indicators, but this is not the only example of this in Agenda 2030. 
Goal 8 aims to “promote sustained, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth, full 
and productive employment and decent work for all”, a statement broad enough 
that we can say with some confidence most people could agree with it. However, 
the SDG indicators have been criticised for failing to fully encapsulate the 
concept of decent work (Frey and MacNaughton, 2016). The SDGs do not, for 
example, include any measure of trade union coverage, working poverty rates or 
working time, all of which are ‘main indicators’ for decent work according to the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO, 2016). Moreover, there are no indicators 
on job satisfaction or fulfilment, reflecting a very different idea of ‘decent work’ 
than those for who such ideas are central (see Burchell et al., 2014 for examples). 
Indeed by conflating decent work with economic growth, and with only 3 of 16 
indicators in Goal 8 (average earnings, work place fatalities and labour rights) 
attempting to measure it (even at a very superficial level), the conceptualisation 
of decent work at the policy level is shown to be contested at the very least. 
This process of making a particular view explicit is, of course, the very same 
source of difficulty that we discussed in Section 3, here reframed as a strength. 
That indicators represent only a single perspective is a problem where they are 
interpreted as neutral fact, but a strength if indicators are understood as a 
clarification of the worldview. We must be clear here that indicators are no 
panacea, they do obscure those political judgements made in the construction of 
the indicator, but they also allow outsiders to see how concepts are being 
operationalised. So, instead of indicators necessarily re-conceptualising a 
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 problem and enforcing a single narrow view, they can also create a platform for 
debate and critique of a concept.  
In part this is related to the public nature of indicators (Porter, 1995).  
Examining the decision making processes of the European Union (EU) and the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), Dutta (2015) finds that the use of 
indicators makes those parts of the MCC decision making process that use 
indicators relatively transparent because,  
“external observers can more easily identify the mechanisms by which 
decisions are supposed to be made. Such legibility makes a contribution to 
accountability; where observers can easily discern how a decision was 
supposed to be made, they can more easily identify deviations in how the 
decision was actually made.” (Dutta, 2015, p. 162) 
Similarly, Finnerty (2005), argues that the use of indicators in the Irish National 
Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS) allows the government to be held to account and 
has formed the basis for much of the critique of the program. 
 
5.2. Indicators facilitate new understandings of complex systems. 
While indicators may lead us to re-conceptualise issues in ways that somehow 
lessen or reduce our understanding of an issue, they can also facilitate a helpful 
re-conceptualisation of knowledge. For example, Porter (1995 p. 37) makes the 
case that the widespread use of quantified indicators helped to create the idea of 
society by reframing individual problems as societal: 
“Indeed the concept of society was itself a part statistical construct. The 
regularities of crime and suicide announced in early investigations of ‘moral 
statistics’ could evidently not be attributed to the individual. So they became 
properties instead of ‘society’…Similarly, people sometimes found themselves 
or people they met to be out of work before this had become a statistical 
phenomenon. The invention of crime rates in the 1830s and unemployment 
rates around 1900 hinted at a different sort of phenomenon, a condition of 
society involving collective responsibility rather than an unfortunate or 
reprehensible condition of individual persons” 
By reframing a concept in this way, indicators can help us to consider new 
options and ways of thinking. As a result, indicators are widely used as tools to 
highlight problems which then guide a more detailed and contextually-sensitive 
analysis. For instance, subjective wellbeing indicators show large spread but 
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 relatively stable mean values. They also vary widely across geographical areas. 
Though the measures themselves do not explain underlying causes, they do 
highlight a potential problem to be explored further (Seaford, 2013). 
The actual process of selecting indicators can also help understanding. This 
paper recognizes that there may be different views of definitions and 
configurations of indicators. By engaging in participatory processes, different 
views can be considered (Fraser et al., 2006, Bell and Morse, 2008) and space can 
be created for the voices of those who might otherwise be excluded. By 
understanding the contested nature of indicators, those indicators selected can 
be refined and the limitations of any research identified. Participatory processes 
for discussion, co-design and co-implementation of indicators became widely 
used in the wake of Local Agenda 21 in the 1990s, which gave considerable 
impetus to community-level initiatives for measuring and practising sustainable 
development (Warburton, 1998; Buckingham and Theobald, 2003). The basic 
claim made for such processes is that they can, by engaging local insights, 
expertise and everyday experience, make indicators both more accountable and 
accepted, and more reflective of local complexity and qualitative as well as 
quantitative change (Lawrence, 1998; MacGillivray, 1998; Walker et al, 2000; 
Chambers, 2008). Despite considerable problems of comparability, scaling and 
integration into national and international indicator sets (Chambers, 2008), 
participatory systems for indicator development can generate important insights 
and build up trust and cooperative capacity (MacGillivray, 1998; Walker et al, 
2000). 
Indicators also enable quantified forms of analysis that can enhance our 
understanding of highly complex systems. A key example, in our view, is the use 
of models to understand dynamic non-linear systems. Such systems are difficult 
to conceptualise and interrogate without models because multiple inter-linkages 
and feedback mechanisms can result in counter-intuitive and emergent 
behaviours (Sterman, 2000). Models can be viewed as tools that mediate between 
theory and reality. In contrast to indicators, system dynamics models show two-
way interlinkages between components, including two-way links between 
intermediate and end goals, and give information about the underlying structure 
(causal links between components) of a system. In this view, models draw from 
both theories and the ‘real’ world but retain a level of autonomy (Morgan and 
Mary, 1999). Therefore, they facilitate learning by allowing users to test and 
refine the mental models (theories, value judgements and assumptions) that 
they inevitably bring to research (Sterman, 2000, Epstein, 2008, Meadows, 2008). 
By manipulating models we are able to see how the outputs of a model diverge 
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 (or converge), from the theoretical predictions or ‘real world’ observations and 
explore why this is the case.  Moreover, where models are sufficiently 
representative of  some aspect of the real world they can be considered 
‘surrogate’ worlds  and we can make qualified inferences from our model world 
to the real world (Sugden, 2000, Mäki, 2009). Indicators are essential in this 
process because they provide the mechanism that allows the model world, 
theory and reality to be compared. 
Reframing a concept may also be useful for more strategic reasons, particularly 
where we believe current concepts are inadequate. Indicators may be pursued by 
communities as a way to try and embed their conceptualisations within decision 
making processes (Hezri and Dovers, 2006).  As discussed in the introduction, 
GDP is widely considered an inadequate measure of societal progress. Though 
GDP itself plays a role in creating an idea of societal progress that is inadequate, 
it is also true that GDP emerged from, and is reinforced by, an inadequate 
concept of societal progress that centres on material goods (see, for example, 
Blair, 1999 and Anderson, 2014). It has been suggested that rival indicators 
present a useful way to challenge GDP and reframe debates on societal progress 
in a broader way (Cassiers and Thiry, 2014). Indeed, the SDGs have been called 
transformative because they represent a much broader and more holistic view of 
societal progress (Hajer et al., 2015, WWF, 2016).  
 
5.3 Looking forwards: Indicators for Sustainable Prosperity. 
The preceding discussion leads us to take a view on the use of indicators in our 
sustainable prosperity work (and contested concepts more generally). To 
promote the use of indicators as tools of clarification and to correct the 
impression that they are objective, the choice of indicators and their 
conceptualization should be developed in participatory way, and explicitly 
linked to a narrative description of a specific sustainable prosperity vision. The 
literature on participatory indicator development emphasises deliberative 
construction of visions in conjunction with a variety of stakeholders and then 
identifying indicators that mean something in the context of that vision (e.g. 
Bell and Morse, 2008). Indeed, the most effective implementation of 
sustainability frameworks, such as Local Agenda 21, involved the co-creation of 
indicators by community groups and other local actors to ensure measures had 
resonance (see, for example, Barrutia and Echebarria, 2012). 
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 For our own work we propose going slightly beyond this and co-creating 
multiple alternative, and possibly conflicting, visions of sustainable prosperity 
(within the understanding outlined in this paper) and then identifying multiple 
conflicting indicator sets that are meaningful and useful to the specific visions. 
By developing intentionally conflicting indicator sets explicitly tied to specific 
visions of sustainable prosperity we hope to emphasise the political nature of 
our indicators. Drawing on the notion that indicators increase levels of 
accountability and clarity, we hope that this process will also create a space in 
which we can critically engage with both the indicators and the visions they 
represent. The alternative indicator sets and visions will be explored using a 
variety of analytical techniques. This will include, but should not be limited to, 
different economic models. 
 
6 Conclusion 
The use of quantified indicators and targets, such as the Sustainable 
Development Goals, the EU Sustainable Development Indicators or the UK 
Sustainable Development Indicators, are now a well established policy tool. 
However, as shown in this paper there is little commonality in the exact 
statistical measure that these frameworks use. Indeed while the outcomes of 
these frameworks appear to have some commonality, at least at the broadest 
level, the measures used are more often against inputs to the system. While the 
geographic scale of these frameworks is important, and we acknowledge the 
place specific nature of measurement (indeed we have highlighted the vital 
aspect of very local measurement of cultural interventions for example), the 
variance in the measures of inputs in these three frameworks still surprised us.  
The common measures across the three frameworks relate to action on climate 
change and economic growth. The GDP per capita indicator, while 
straightforward, dominates the political process and without a structured 
approach to dialogue around policy development it often drives outcomes which 
are counter to the other indicators included in the frameworks. As the SDGs 
develop further, and specific indicator targets are agreed, this wider issue of 
process and the importance of acknowledging the difference between input 
(means) and outcome (ends) measures should not be lost.   
To develop and use indicators which might measure sustainable prosperity poses 
numerous challenges. For CUSP the process around the political use and misuse 
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 (or disregard) of these indicators is as important as the indicators themselves 
and this is often not explored in their reporting. This should form an important 
part of the exploration of prosperity in practice. The limits of indicators, both in 
regard to what they can measure as well as their historic use to measure things 
that some perceive as either worthless or indeed driving incorrect behaviours, 
should also be acknowledged within CUSP’s work.  
Given the place of arts and culture within CUSP we need to acknowledge the 
implications of dialogue with this sector in the context of indicators and it will 
provide a useful case to explore the use of measures and indicators. For example, 
indicators of cultural consumption are important in understanding who is (and 
isn’t) participating. However, these types of indicators need to be sensitive to 
amateur, vernacular and everyday kinds of activity outside funded, legitimated 
organisations as well as account for the aversion, or outright hostility, on the 
part of practitioners and arts organisations towards attempts to measure, 
evaluate and quantify their activity, and the perceived instrumentalisation of art 
and culture. Thinking about how to capture social capital in ways that provides a 
basis for comparison may also be important in understanding how it affects 
health, wellbeing and other markers of sustainable prosperity. If art and culture, 
alternative investment models or increasing community development through 
social enterprise, can promote a kind of sustainable prosperity then we must 
understand, as a matter of social justice and perhaps environmental necessity, 
how to make them accessible to all. Robust indicators can play an important part 
in developing these narratives. 
Developing a multi-dimensional view of sustainable prosperity based on trans-
disciplinary research and dialogue across sectors requires us to break down many 
barriers. There is a need for us to debate the meaning of ‘modelling’ and scenario 
testing alongside measurement and indicators. CUSP, as a team, will reflect on 
how we work in an interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary way, to explore these 
issues. 
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 APPENDIX 
A1: UN Sustainable Development Goals  
Note that the SDG Indicator list has 241 indicators however 9 are repeated under two 
or three categories and therefore the total number of indicators is 230.  
 
Goal 1 | End poverty in all its forms everywhere 
1. Proportion of population below the international poverty line, by sex, 
age, employment status and geographical location (urban/rural) 
2. Proportion of population living below the national poverty line, by sex 
and age 
3. Proportion of men, women and children of all ages living in poverty in 
all its dimensions according to national definitions 
4. Proportion of population covered by social protection floors/systems, 
by sex, distinguishing children, unemployed persons, older persons, 
persons with disabilities, pregnant women, newborns, work-injury 
victims and the poor and the vulnerable 
5. Proportion of population living in households with access to basic 
services 
6. Proportion of total adult population with secure tenure rights to land, 
with legally recognized documentation and who perceive their rights 
to land as secure, by sex and by type of tenure 
7. Number of deaths, missing persons and persons affected by disaster 
per 100,000 people 
8. Direct disaster economic loss in relation to global gross domestic 
product (GDP) 
9. Number of countries with national and local disaster risk reduction 
strategies 
10. Proportion of resources allocated by the government directly to 
poverty reduction programmes 
11. Proportion of total government spending on essential services 
(education, health and social protection) 
12. Proportion of government recurrent and capital spending to sectors 
that disproportionately benefit women, the poor and vulnerable 
groups 
Goal 2 | End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote 
sustainable agriculture 
13. Prevalence of undernourishment 
14. Prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity in the population, 
based on the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES) 
15. Prevalence of stunting (height for age <-2 standard deviation from the 
median of the World Health Organization (WHO) Child Growth 
Standards) among children under 5 years of age 
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 16. Prevalence of malnutrition (weight for height >+2 or <-2 standard 
deviation from the median of the WHO Child Growth Standards) 
among children under 5 years of age, by type (wasting and overweight) 
17. Volume of production per labour unit by classes of 
farming/pastoral/forestry enterprise size 
18. Average income of small-scale food producers, by sex and indigenous 
status 
19. Proportion of agricultural area under productive and sustainable 
agriculture 
20. Number of plant and animal genetic resources for food and agriculture 
secured in either medium or long-term conservation facilities 
21. Proportion of local breeds classified as being at risk, not-at-risk or at 
unknown level of risk of extinction 
22. The agriculture orientation index for government expenditures 
23. Total official flows (official development assistance plus other official 
flows) to the agriculture sector 
24. Producer Support Estimate 
25. Agricultural export subsidies 
26. Indicator of food price anomalies 
Goal 3 | Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages 
27. Maternal mortality ratio 
28. Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel 
29. Under-five mortality rate 
30. Neonatal mortality rate 
31. Number of new HIV infections per 1,000 uninfected population, by sex, 
age and key populations 
32. Tuberculosis incidence per 1,000 population 
33. Malaria incidence per 1,000 population 
34. Hepatitis B incidence per 100,000 population 
35. Number of people requiring interventions against neglected tropical 
diseases 
36. Mortality rate attributed to cardiovascular disease, cancer, diabetes or 
chronic respiratory disease 
37. Suicide mortality rate 
38. Coverage of treatment interventions (pharmacological, psychosocial 
and rehabilitation and aftercare services) for substance use disorders 
39. Harmful use of alcohol, defined according to the national context as 
alcohol per capita consumption (aged 15 years and older) within a 
calendar year in litres of pure alcohol 
40. Death rate due to road traffic injuries 
41. Proportion of women of reproductive age (aged 15-49 years) who have 
their need for family planning satisfied with modern methods 
42. Adolescent birth rate (aged 10-14 years; aged 15-19 years) per 1,000 
women in that age group 
43. Coverage of essential health services (defined as the average coverage 
of essential services based on tracer interventions that include 
reproductive, maternal, newborn and child health, infectious diseases, 
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 non-communicable diseases and service capacity and access, among 
the general and the most disadvantaged population) 
44. Number of people covered by health insurance or a public health 
system per 1,000 population 
45. Mortality rate attributed to household and ambient air pollution 
46. Mortality rate attributed to unsafe water, unsafe sanitation and lack of 
hygiene (exposure to unsafe Water, Sanitation and Hygiene for All 
(WASH) services) 
47. Mortality rate attributed to unintentional poisoning 
48. Age-standardized prevalence of current tobacco use among persons 
aged 15 years and older 
49. Proportion of the population with access to affordable medicines and 
vaccines on a sustainable basis 
50. Total net official development assistance to medical research and 
basic health sectors 
51. Health worker density and distribution 
52. International Health Regulations (IHR) capacity and health emergency 
preparedness 
Goal 4 | Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong 
learning opportunities for all 
53. Proportion of children and young people: (a) in grades 2/3; (b) at the 
end of primary; and (c) at the end of lower secondary achieving at least 
a minimum proficiency level in (i) reading and (ii) mathematics, by sex 
54. Proportion of children under 5 years of age who are developmentally 
on track in health, learning and psychosocial well-being, by sex 
55. Participation rate in organized learning (one year before the official 
primary entry age), by sex 
56. Participation rate of youth and adults in formal and non-formal 
education and training in the previous 12 months, by sex 
57. Proportion of youth and adults with information and communications 
technology (ICT) skills, by type of skill 
58. Parity indices (female/male, rural/urban, bottom/top wealth quintile 
and others such as disability status, indigenous peoples and conflict-
affected, as data become available) for all education indicators on this 
list that can be disaggregated 
59. Percentage of population in a given age group achieving at least a 
fixed level of proficiency in functional (a) literacy and (b) numeracy 
skills, by sex 
60. Extent to which (i) global citizenship education and (ii) education for 
sustainable development, including gender equality and human rights, 
are mainstreamed at all levels in: (a) national education policies, (b) 
curricula, (c) teacher education and (d) student assessment 
61. Proportion of schools with access to: (a) electricity; (b) the Internet for 
pedagogical purposes; (c) computers for pedagogical purposes; 
(d) adapted infrastructure and materials for students with disabilities; 
(e) basic drinking water; (f) single-sex basic sanitation facilities; and (g) 
basic handwashing facilities (as per the WASH indicator definitions) 
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 62. Volume of official development assistance flows for scholarships by 
sector and type of study 
63. Proportion of teachers in: (a) pre-primary; (b) primary; (c) lower 
secondary; and (d) upper secondary education who have received at 
least the minimum organized teacher training (e.g. pedagogical 
training) pre-service or in-service required for teaching at the relevant 
level in a given country 
Goal 5 | Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls 
64. Whether or not legal frameworks are in place to promote, enforce and 
monitor equality and non‑discrimination on the basis of sex 
65. Proportion of ever-partnered women and girls aged 15 years and older 
subjected to physical, sexual or psychological violence by a current or 
former intimate partner in the previous 12 months, by form of violence 
and by age 
66. Proportion of women and girls aged 15 years and older subjected to 
sexual violence by persons other than an intimate partner in the 
previous 12 months, by age and place of occurrence 
67. Proportion of women aged 20-24 years who were married or in a union 
before age 15 and before age 18 
68. Proportion of girls and women aged 15-49 years who have undergone 
female genital mutilation/cutting, by age 
69. Proportion of time spent on unpaid domestic and care work, by sex, 
age and location 
70. Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments and local 
governments 
71. Proportion of women in managerial positions 
72. Proportion of women aged 15-49 years who make their own informed 
decisions regarding sexual relations, contraceptive use and 
reproductive health care 
73. Number of countries with laws and regulations that guarantee women 
aged 15-49 years access to sexual and reproductive health care, 
information and education 
74.  (a) Proportion of total agricultural population with ownership or 
secure rights over agricultural land, by sex; and (b) share of women 
among owners or rights-bearers of agricultural land, by type of tenure 
75. Proportion of countries where the legal framework (including 
customary law) guarantees women’s equal rights to land ownership 
and/or control 
76. Proportion of individuals who own a mobile telephone, by sex 
77. Proportion of countries with systems to track and make public 
allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment 
Goal 6 | Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation 
for all 
78. Proportion of population using safely managed drinking water services 
79. Proportion of population using safely managed sanitation services, 
including a hand-washing facility with soap and water 
80. Proportion of wastewater safely treated 
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 81. Proportion of bodies of water with good ambient water quality 
82. Change in water-use efficiency over time 
83. Level of water stress: freshwater withdrawal as a proportion of 
available freshwater resources 
84. Degree of integrated water resources management implementation (0-
100) 
85. Proportion of transboundary basin area with an operational 
arrangement for water cooperation 
86. Change in the extent of water-related ecosystems over time 
87. Amount of water- and sanitation-related official development 
assistance that is part of a government-coordinated spending plan 
88. Proportion of local administrative units with established and 
operational policies and procedures for participation of local 
communities in water and sanitation management 
Goal 7 | Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for 
all  
89. Proportion of population with access to electricity 
90. Proportion of population with primary reliance on clean fuels and 
technology 
91. Renewable energy share in the total final energy consumption 
92. Energy intensity measured in terms of primary energy and GDP 
93. Mobilized amount of United States dollars per year starting in 2020 
accountable towards the $100 billion commitment 
94. Investments in energy efficiency as a percentage of GDP and the 
amount of foreign direct investment in financial transfer for 
infrastructure and technology to sustainable development services 
Goal 8 | Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and 
productive employment and decent work for all 
95. Annual growth rate of real GDP per capita 
96. Annual growth rate of real GDP per employed person 
97. Proportion of informal employment in non‑agriculture employment, 
by sex 
98. Material footprint, material footprint per capita, and material footprint 
per GDP 
99. Domestic material consumption, domestic material consumption per 
capita, and domestic material consumption per GDP 
100. Average hourly earnings of female and male employees, by 
occupation, age and persons with disabilities 
101. Unemployment rate, by sex, age and persons with disabilities 
102. Proportion of youth (aged 15-24 years) not in education, employment 
or training 
103. Proportion and number of children aged 5‑17 years engaged in child 
labour, by sex and age 
104. Frequency rates of fatal and non-fatal occupational injuries, by sex and 
migrant status 
105. Increase in national compliance of labour rights (freedom of 
association and collective bargaining) based on International Labour 
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 Organization (ILO) textual sources and national legislation, by sex and 
migrant status 
106. Tourism direct GDP as a proportion of total GDP and in growth rate 
107. Number of jobs in tourism industries as a proportion of total jobs and 
growth rate of jobs, by sex 
108. Number of commercial bank branches and automated teller machines 
(ATMs) per 100,000 adults 
109. Proportion of adults (15 years and older) with an account at a bank or 
other financial institution or with a mobile-money-service provider 
110. Aid for Trade commitments and disbursements 
111. Total government spending in social protection and employment 
programmes as a proportion of the national budgets and GDP 
Goal 9 | Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable 
industrialization and foster innovation 
112. Proportion of the rural population who live within 2 km of an all-
season road 
113. Passenger and freight volumes, by mode of transport 
114. Manufacturing value added as a proportion of GDP and per capita 
115. Manufacturing employment as a proportion of total employment 
116. Proportion of small-scale industries in total industry value added 
117. Proportion of small-scale industries with a loan or line of credit 
118. CO2 emission per unit of value added 
119. Research and development expenditure as a proportion of GDP 
120. Researchers (in full-time equivalent) per million inhabitants 
121. Total official international support (official development assistance 
plus other official flows) to infrastructure 
122. Proportion of medium and high-tech industry value added in total 
value added 
123. Proportion of population covered by a mobile network, by technology 
Goal 10 | Reduce inequality within and among countries 
124. Growth rates of household expenditure or income per capita among 
the bottom 40 per cent of the population and the total population 
125. Proportion of people living below 50 per cent of median income, by 
age, sex and persons with disabilities 
126. Proportion of the population reporting having personally felt 
discriminated against or harassed within the previous 12 months on 
the basis of a ground of discrimination prohibited under international 
human rights law 
127. Labour share of GDP, comprising wages and social protection transfers 
128. 10.5.1 Financial Soundness Indicators 
129. Proportion of members and voting rights of developing countries in 
international organizations 
130. Recruitment cost borne by employee as a proportion of yearly income 
earned in country of destination 
131. Number of countries that have implemented well-managed migration 
policies 
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 132. Proportion of tariff lines applied to imports from least developed 
countries and developing countries with zero-tariff 
133. Total resource flows for development, by recipient and donor 
countries and type of flow (e.g. official development assistance, 
foreign direct investment and other flows) 
134. Remittance costs as a proportion of the amount remitted 
Goal 11 | Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and 
sustainable  
135. Proportion of urban population living in slums, informal settlements or 
inadequate housing 
136. Proportion of population that has convenient access to public 
transport, by sex, age and persons with disabilities 
137. Ratio of land consumption rate to population growth rate 
138. Proportion of cities with a direct participation structure of civil society 
in urban planning and management that operate regularly and 
democratically 
139. Total expenditure (public and private) per capita spent on the 
preservation, protection and conservation of all cultural and natural 
heritage, by type of heritage (cultural, natural, mixed and World 
Heritage Centre designation), level of government (national, regional 
and local/municipal), type of expenditure (operating 
expenditure/investment) and type of private funding (donations in 
kind, private non-profit sector and sponsorship) 
140. Number of deaths, missing persons and persons affected by disaster 
per 100,000 peoplea 
141. Direct disaster economic loss in relation to global GDP, including 
disaster damage to critical infrastructure and disruption of basic 
services 
142. Proportion of urban solid waste regularly collected and with adequate 
final discharge out of total urban solid waste generated, by cities 
143. Annual mean levels of fine particulate matter (e.g. PM2.5 and PM10) in 
cities (population weighted) 
144. Average share of the built-up area of cities that is open space for public 
use for all, by sex, age and persons with disabilities 
145. Proportion of persons victim of physical or sexual harassment, by sex, 
age, disability status and place of occurrence, in the previous 12 
months 
146. Proportion of population living in cities that implement urban and 
regional development plans integrating population projections and 
resource needs, by size of city 
147. Proportion of local governments that adopt and implement local 
disaster risk reduction strategies in line with the Sendai Framework for 
Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030a 
148. Number of countries with national and local disaster risk reduction 
strategies 
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 149. Proportion of financial support to the least developed countries that is 
allocated to the construction and retrofitting of sustainable, resilient 
and resource-efficient buildings utilizing local materials 
Goal 12 | Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns 
150. Number of countries with sustainable consumption and production 
(SCP) national action plans or SCP mainstreamed as a priority or a 
target into national policies 
151. Material footprint, material footprint per capita, and material footprint 
per GDP 
152. Domestic material consumption, domestic material consumption per 
capita, and domestic material consumption per GDP 
153. Global food loss index 
154. Number of parties to international multilateral environmental 
agreements on hazardous waste, and other chemicals that meet their 
commitments and obligations in transmitting information as required 
by each relevant agreement 
155. Hazardous waste generated per capita and proportion of hazardous 
waste treated, by type of treatment 
156. National recycling rate, tons of material recycled 
157. Number of companies publishing sustainability reports 
158. Number of countries implementing sustainable public procurement 
policies and action plans 
159. Extent to which (i) global citizenship education and (ii) education for 
sustainable development (including climate change education) are 
mainstreamed in (a) national education policies; (b) curricula; (c) 
teacher education; and (d) student assessment 
160. Amount of support to developing countries on research and 
development for sustainable consumption and production and 
environmentally sound technologies 
161. Number of sustainable tourism strategies or policies and implemented 
action plans with agreed monitoring and evaluation tools 
162. Amount of fossil-fuel subsidies per unit of GDP (production and 
consumption) and as a proportion of total national expenditure on 
fossil fuels 
Goal 13 | Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts 
163. Number of countries with national and local disaster risk reduction 
strategies 
164. Number of deaths, missing persons and persons affected by disaster 
per 100,000 people 
165. Number of countries that have communicated the establishment or 
operationalization of an integrated policy/strategy/plan which 
increases their ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate 
change, and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas 
emissions development in a manner that does not threaten food 
production (including a national adaptation plan, nationally 
determined contribution, national communication, biennial update 
report or other) 
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 166. Number of countries that have integrated mitigation, adaptation, 
impact reduction and early warning into primary, secondary and 
tertiary curricula 
167. Number of countries that have communicated the strengthening of 
institutional, systemic and individual capacity-building to implement 
adaptation, mitigation and technology transfer, and development 
actions 
168. Mobilized amount of United States dollars per year starting in 2020 
accountable towards the $100 billion commitment 
169. Number of least developed countries and small island developing 
States that are receiving specialized support, and amount of support, 
including finance, technology and capacity-building, for mechanisms 
for raising capacities for effective climate change-related planning and 
management, including focusing on women, youth and local and 
marginalized communities  
Goal 14 | Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for 
sustainable development 
170. Index of coastal eutrophication and floating plastic debris density 
171. Proportion of national exclusive economic zones managed using 
ecosystem-based approaches 
172. Average marine acidity (pH) measured at agreed suite of 
representative sampling stations 
173. Proportion of fish stocks within biologically sustainable levels 
174. Coverage of protected areas in relation to marine areas 
175. Progress by countries in the degree of implementation of international 
instruments aiming to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated 
fishing 
176. Sustainable fisheries as a percentage of GDP in small island developing 
States, least developed countries and all countries 
177. Proportion of total research budget allocated to research in the field of 
marine technology 
178. Progress by countries in the degree of application of a 
legal/regulatory/policy/institutional framework which recognizes and 
protects access rights for small-scale fisheries 
179. Number of countries making progress in ratifying, accepting and 
implementing through legal, policy and institutional frameworks, 
ocean-related instruments that implement international law, as 
reflected in the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea, for 
the conservation and sustainable use of the oceans and their 
resources 
Goal 15 | Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, 
sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land 
degradation and halt biodiversity loss 
180. Forest area as a proportion of total land area 
181. Proportion of important sites for terrestrial and freshwater biodiversity 
that are covered by protected areas, by ecosystem type 
182. Progress towards sustainable forest management 
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 183. Proportion of land that is degraded over total land area 
184. Coverage by protected areas of important sites for mountain 
biodiversity 
185. Mountain Green Cover Index 
186. Red List Index 
187. Number of countries that have adopted legislative, administrative and 
policy frameworks to ensure fair and equitable sharing of benefits 
188. Proportion of traded wildlife that was poached or illicitly trafficked 
189. Proportion of countries adopting relevant national legislation and 
adequately resourcing the prevention or control of invasive alien 
species 
190. Progress towards national targets established in accordance with Aichi 
Biodiversity Target 2 of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 
191. Official development assistance and public expenditure on 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity and ecosystems 
192. Official development assistance and public expenditure on 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity and ecosystems 
193. Proportion of traded wildlife that was poached or illicitly trafficked 
Goal 16 | Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, 
provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive 
institutions at all levels 
194. Number of victims of intentional homicide per 100,000 population, by 
sex and age 
195. Conflict-related deaths per 100,000 population, by sex, age and cause 
196. Proportion of population subjected to physical, psychological or 
sexual violence in the previous 12 months 
197. Proportion of population that feel safe walking alone around the area 
they live 
198. Proportion of children aged 1-17 years who experienced any physical 
punishment and/or psychological aggression by caregivers in the past 
month 
199. Number of victims of human trafficking per 100,000 population, by sex, 
age and form of exploitation 
200. Proportion of young women and men aged 18‑29 years who 
experienced sexual violence by age 18 
201. Proportion of victims of violence in the previous 12 months who 
reported their victimization to competent authorities or other officially 
recognized conflict resolution mechanisms 
202. Unsentenced detainees as a proportion of overall prison population 
203. Total value of inward and outward illicit financial flows (in current 
United States dollars) 
204. Proportion of seized small arms and light weapons that are recorded 
and traced, in accordance with international standards and legal 
instruments 
205. Proportion of persons who had at least one contact with a public 
official and who paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a 
bribe by those public officials, during the previous 12 months 
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 206. Proportion of businesses that had at least one contact with a public 
official and that paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a 
bribe by those public officials during the previous 12 months 
207. Primary government expenditures as a proportion of original approved 
budget, by sector (or by budget codes or similar) 
208. Proportion of the population satisfied with their last experience of 
public services 
209. Proportions of positions (by sex, age, persons with disabilities and 
population groups) in public institutions (national and local 
legislatures, public service, and judiciary) compared to national 
distributions 
210. Proportion of population who believe decision-making is inclusive and 
responsive, by sex, age, disability and population group 
211. Proportion of members and voting rights of developing countries in 
international organizations 
212. Proportion of children under 5 years of age whose births have been 
registered with a civil authority, by age 
213. Number of verified cases of killing, kidnapping, enforced 
disappearance, arbitrary detention and torture of journalists, 
associated media personnel, trade unionists and human rights 
advocates in the previous 12 months 
214. Number of countries that adopt and implement constitutional, 
statutory and/or policy guarantees for public access to information 
215. Existence of independent national human rights institutions in 
compliance with the Paris Principles 
216. Proportion of population reporting having personally felt 
discriminated against or harassed in the previous 12 months on the 
basis of a ground of discrimination prohibited under international 
human rights law 
Goal 17 | Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the Global 
Partnership for Sustainable Development 
217. Total government revenue as a proportion of GDP, by source 
218. Proportion of domestic budget funded by domestic taxes 
219. Net official development assistance, total and to least developed 
countries, as a proportion of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance 
Committee donors’ gross national income (GNI) 
220. Foreign direct investments (FDI), official development assistance and 
South-South Cooperation as a proportion of total domestic budget 
221. Volume of remittances (in United States dollars) as a proportion of 
total GDP 
222. Debt service as a proportion of exports of goods and services 
223. Number of countries that adopt and implement investment promotion 
regimes for least developed countries 
224. Number of science and/or technology cooperation agreements and 
programmes between countries, by type of cooperation 
225. Fixed Internet broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, by speed 
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 226. Total amount of approved funding for developing countries to 
promote the development, transfer, dissemination and diffusion of 
environmentally sound technologies 
227. Proportion of individuals using the Internet 
228. Dollar value of financial and technical assistance (including through 
North-South, South-South and triangular cooperation) committed to 
developing countries 
229. Worldwide weighted tariff-average 
230. Developing countries’ and least developed countries’ share of global 
exports 
231. Average tariffs faced by developing countries, least developed 
countries and small island developing States 
232. Macroeconomic Dashboard 
233. Number of countries with mechanisms in place to enhance policy 
coherence of sustainable development 
234. Extent of use of country-owned results frameworks and planning tools 
by providers of development cooperation 
235. Number of countries reporting progress in multi-stakeholder 
development effectiveness monitoring frameworks that support the 
achievement of the sustainable development goals 
236. Amount of United States dollars committed to public-private and civil 
society partnerships 
237. Proportion of sustainable development indicators produced at the 
national level with full disaggregation when relevant to the target, in 
accordance with the Fundamental Principles of Official Statistics 
238. Number of countries that have national statistical legislation that 
complies with the Fundamental Principles of Official Statistics 
239. Number of countries with a national statistical plan that is fully funded 
and under implementation, by source of funding 
240. Dollar value of all resources made available to strengthen statistical 
capacity in developing countries 
241. Proportion of countries that (a) have conducted at least one 
population and housing census in the last 10 years; and (b) have 
achieved 100 per cent birth registration and 80 per cent death 
registration 
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 A2: EU sustainable development indicators (SDIs)  
Socioeconomic development  
1. Real GDP per capita  
2. Investment by institutional sectors  
3. Dispersion of regional GDP per inhabitant   
4. Net national income  
5. Household saving rate  
6. Real adjusted gross disposable income of households per capita  
7. Labour productivity per hour worked  
8. Total R&D expenditure  
9. Real effective exchange rate - 37 trading partners  
10. Turnover from innovation  
11. Energy intensity of the economy  
12. Eco-innovation index  
13. Total employment rate  
14. Employment rate by educational attainment level  
15. Dispersion of regional employment rates, by sex  
16. Total unemployment rate  
17. Young people neither in employment nor in education and training 
(15-24 years) - % of the total population in the same age group  
18. Nominal unit labour cost - 3 years % change    
Sustainable consumption and production  
19. Resource productivity  
20. Generation of waste excluding major mineral wastes  
21. Components of domestic material consumption  
22. Domestic material consumption by material - 1 000 t  
23. Municipal waste generation and treatment, by type of treatment 
method  
24. Generation of hazardous waste by economic activity  
25. Emissions of sulphur oxides (SOx) by source sector  
26. Emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx) by source sector  
27. Emissions of non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOC) by 
source sector   
28. Emissions of ammonia (NH3), by source sector  
29. Electricity consumption by households  
30. Final energy consumption by sector  
31. Motorisation rate  
32. Organisations and sites with eco-management and audit scheme 
(EMAS) registration  
33. Ecolabel licenses  
34. Area under agri-environmental commitment  
35. Area under organic farming  
36. Livestock density index  
37. Number of persons in households  
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 38. Final consumption expenditure of households, by consumption 
purpose    
Social inclusion  
39. People at risk of poverty or social exclusion 
40. Persistent-at-risk-of-poverty rate  
41. Relative median at-risk-of-poverty gap  
42. Inequality of income distribution   
43. Severely materially deprived people  
44. People at risk of poverty after social transfers  
45. People living in households with very low work intensity  
46. In work at-risk-of-poverty rate   
47. Long-term unemployment rate, by sex   
48. Gender pay gap in unadjusted form  
49. Early leavers from education and training  
50. At-risk-of-poverty-rate, by highest level of education attained  
51. At most lower secondary educational attainment by age  
52. Lifelong learning  
53. Low reading literacy performance of pupils  
54. Individuals' level of computer skills  
55. Individuals' level of internet skills  
56. Tertiary educational attainment by sex, age group 30-34  
57. Public expenditure on education  
Demographic changes  
58. Employment rate of older workers 
59. Total fertility rate  
60. Crude rate of net migration plus adjustment  
61. Healthy life years and life expectancy at age 65, by sex  
62. Crude rate of population change   
63. Aggregate replacement ratio  
64.  General government gross debt  
65. Duration of working life  
66. Old-age-dependency ratio  
67. Projected old-age dependency ratio  
68. Population projections  
69. Pension expenditure projections (baseline scenario)  
70. Expenditure on care for elderly 
Public health 
71. Life expectancy and healthy life years 
72. Death rate due to chronic diseases  
73. Suicide death rate, by age group  
74. Self-reported unmet needs for medical care due to being too expensive, 
by income quintile  
75. People having a long-standing illness or health problem, by income 
quintile  
76. Production of toxic chemicals, by toxicity class  
77. Urban population exposure to air pollution by particulate matter  
78. Urban population exposure to air pollution by ozone  
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 79. Proportion of population living in households considering that they 
suffer from noise  
80. Non-fatal accidents at work by sex  
Climate and energy 
81. Greenhouse gas emissions 
82. Primary energy consumption 
83. Greenhouse gas emissions by sector 
84. Greenhouse gas emissions intensity of energy consumption 
85. Energy dependence 
86. Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption   
87. Gross inland energy consumption by fuel type  
88. Electricity generated from renewable sources  
89. Share of renewable energy in fuel consumption of transport    
90. Combined heat and power generation 
91. Projections of greenhouse gas emissions  
92. Global and European surface temperature deviation    
Sustainable transport  
93. Energy consumption of transport relative to GDP 
94. Modal split of freight transport 
95. Volume of freight transport relative to GDP 
96. Modal split of passenger transport 
97. Volume of passenger transport relative to GDP 
98. Energy consumption of transport, by mode  
99. Greenhouse gas emissions from transport 
100. People killed in road accidents 
101. Average CO2 emissions per kilometre from new passenger cars 
102. Emissions of nitrogen oxides from transport 
103. Emissions of particulate matter from transport 
104. HICP – annual average indices for transport prices  
Natural resources  
105. Common bird index 
106. Sufficiency of sites designated under the EU Habitats directive 
107. Water exploitation index   
108. Population connected to urban wastewater treatment with at least 
secondary treatment  
109. Biochemical oxygen demand in rivers   
110. Fishing fleet, total engine power  
111. Artificial land cover 
112. Forest increment and fellings  
113. Nutrient balance on agricultural land 
114. Deadwood 
 
Global partnership  
115. Official development assistance as share of gross national income  
116. Imports from developing countries by income group 
117. Imports from developing countries by group of products  
118. Imports from least-developed countries by group of products  
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 119. Aggregated measurement of support for agriculture 
120. Financing for developing countries 
121. Foreign direct investment in developing countries, by income group  
122. Official development assistance, by income group  
123. Untied official development assistance  
124. Bilateral official development assistance, by category   
125. CO2 emissions per inhabitant in the EU and in developing countries 
126. Official Development Assistance per capita in donor and recipient 
countries  
127. Population living on less than 1.90 USD per day 
128. Population with sustainable access to an improved water source 
Good governance  
129. Citizens’ confidence in EU institutions 
130. Infringement cases 
131. Transposition deficit of EU law 
132. Voter turnout in national and EU parliamentary elections  
133. Shares of environmental and labour taxes in total tax revenues from 
taxes and social contributions  
134. Implicit tax rate on energy    
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 A3: UK sustainable development indicators (SDIs)  
Economy  
1. GDP 
2. GDP per head 
3. Median income  
4. Per cent of adults unemployed over 12 months  
5. Children in relative low income households  
6. Children in absolute low income households  
7. Value of human capital stock  
8. Value of human capital per head  
9. Population estimates and projections  
10. Household estimates and projections  
11. Public sector net debt and public sector net borrowing as proportion 
of GDP 
12. Percentage of eligible workers in a workplace pension scheme  
13. Total non-financial assets net worth  
14. Expenditure on R&D performed in UK business  
15. Expenditure on R&D related to environmental protection expenditure  
16. Value of environmental goods and services sector  
Social  
17. Healthy life expectancy at birth (males)  
18. Healthy life expectancy at birth (females)  
19. Proportion of people engaging in actions addressing issues of public 
concern  
20. Proportion of people engaging in any volunteering activity  
21. Proportion of people who have someone to rely on  
22. The percentage of people who agree strongly that they felt they 
belonged to their neighbourhood  
23. Proportion of adults from less advantaged groups in managerial or 
professional positions  
24. Net additional dwellings  
25. Mortality from deaths considered avoidable  
26. Mortality from deaths considered preventable  
27. Mortality from deaths considered amenable  
28. Percentage of adults overweight or obese  
29. Percentage of children (2-15) overweight or obese  
30. Prevalence of smoking among adults  
31. Proportion of urban trips under 5 miles taken by walking or cycling   
32. Proportion of urban trips under 5 miles taken by public transport  
33. Proportion of adults doing the recommended 150 minutes of physical 
activity each week  
34. Average daily consumption of fruit and vegetables  
35. Incidence of birth weight less than 2,500g in full term live births in 
England  
36. Number of air pollution days classed as moderate or higher – rural  
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 37. Number of air pollution days classed as moderate or higher – urban  
38. Percentage of the population affected by noise  
39. Number of households in fuel poverty  
Environment  
40. Greenhouse gas emitted within the UK  
41. Greenhouse gas emissions associated with UK consumption  
42. Raw material consumption – construction materials  
43. Raw material consumption – non-construction materials  
44. Breeding farmland birds  
45. Breeding woodland birds  
46. Breeding wetland birds 
47. Breeding seabirds  
48. Estimated direct actual abstractions from non-tidal surface waters and 
groundwaters  
49. Energy supply (CO2 emissions) 
50. Transport (CO2 emissions) 
51. Business (CO2 emissions) 
52. Residential (CO2 emissions) 
53. Other (CO2 emissions) 
54. Proportion of gross energy consumption from renewable sources  
55. Mean SAP rating of existing housing  
56. Mean SAP rating of new homes  
57. Proportion of household waste recycled  
58. Proportion of construction and demolition waste recovered  
59. Land use and development  
60. Origins of food consumer in the UK 
61. Proportion of rivers with biological quality classed as good or high  
62. Proportion of rivers which pass on chemical status  
63. Percentage of fish stocks harvested sustainably  
64. Percentage of UK species of European importance in favourable or 
improving conservation status  
65. Percentage of UK habitats of European importance in favourable or 
improving conservation status 
66. UK biodiversity impact overseas  
 
